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No one can now deny that the Scottish referendum on 
devolution, held on March 1, 1979, was a significant poli·tical 
event. On that day Scottish voters were asked "Do you want 
the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 to be put into effect?" 
1,230.937 voted "Yes", 1,153,502 voted "No" and 1,362,783 
did not vote all (more detailed results are given in the reference 
section). This indecisive result led within a month to the defeat 
of the Labour Government in a vote of confidence in the 
House of Commons - the first such defeat for fifty years -
and a General Election. So we can expect the referendum 
campaign to attract continuing interest from poJi,tical scientists 
and historians, and this will certainly be a good thing. It is 
still too early to take an objective view of why the campaign 
developed the way it did and why the Scottish people, who 
had apparently been heavily committed to seeing some form 
of legislative Assembly being set up in Edinburgh, did not 
turn out to vote in sufficient numbers to ensure that thei!l" 
wishes were fulfilled. 
I make this qualification at the beginning of this chapter 
because, although I shall attempt to be impartial and in fact 
took no part in either side in the campaign, what I wr~te must 
necessarily be subjective if it is to be anything more than a 
meaningless rehearsal of speeches and handouts. Some of my 
conclusions have already been published in articles in The 
Financial Times and have been challenged, notably by Mr 
Adam Ferguson of the "Scotland Says No" organisation (The 
Daily Telegraph, March 11, 1979). 
My argument is that, despite beginning with the advan-
tage that opinion polls had consistently over many years shown 
Scottish voters two-to-one in favour of devolution, the "Yes" 
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side failed to win a sufficient majority in the referendum 
because it was hopelessly divided and its arguments and its 
efforts were often contradictory, because it underestimated the 
strength of the opposition and because it made several tactical 
blunders. 
The devolution referendum was important, not only for 
its immediate political effect, but also because it confirmed the 
place of the referendum in British politics. The precedent had 
been set by the referendum on membership of the European 
Economic Community in 1975, but the Scottish devolution 
referendum (and the similar one held in Wales on the same 
day) and its campaign, differed significantly. Firstly, a simple 
majority of those voting was not sufficient to decide the out-
come, as it had been in the EEC referendum; and. secondly, 
neither the groups campaigning for a "Yes" vote nor those on 
the "No" side were able to find sufficient common ground 
to unite them under all-party umbrella organisations. Whereas 
in 1975 there had been two sides, offering a clear-cut choice, 
in 1979 there were at least six bodies pressing the electorate 
to vote "Yes" or "No". 
The idea of holding a referendum was first mooted in 
the autumn of 1976 when the Labour Government's first at-
tempt at devolution legislation, the Scotland and Wales Bill, 
was making its faltering way through Parliament. Who origin-
ally made the suggestion is not clear, but it was taken up by 
Mr Michael Foot, Leader of the Commons, as a way of 
persuading dissident Labour MPs to support the Bill. When 
the second measure was introduced, as the Scotland Bill, the 
referendum idea was revi,ved with the same intention and in 
fact a number of Labour MPs (such as Mr Robin Cook, 
Edinburgh Central) who were opposed to devolution were 
prepared to vote for the Scotland Bill on the understanding 
they would be free to campaign against it in the referendum. 
The date for the vote was announced in the Queen's Speech 
on November 1, 1978. The Prime Minister told the Commons 
that March 1, 1979 had been chosen to allow the referendum 
to be held on the new electoral register which would be pub-
lished in mid-February and was therefore likely to be reasonably 
accurate when the vote was held. This was important because 
a clause inserted into the Scotland Act (as it had then become) 
against the Government's wishes required 40% of the whole 
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electorate to vote in favour of devolution before the Act 
could be put into effect. Opponents of this clause (the 
"Cunningham Amendment", after Mr George Cunningham, 
Islington South, who proposed it) argued, with justification, 
that the older the register, the harder i1t would be to clear 
this hurdle, since as time went on and people died or moved 
away from places in which they were registered. the register 
would increasingly overestimate the size of the total electorate. 
But the long delay between the announcement and the 
referendum itself also gave the two sides plenty of time in 
which to prepare themselves. 
The pre-Christmas period was spent mainly in internal 
organisation, sorting out who was going to campaign with 
whom, forming local groups, raising funds, booking meeting 
halls, poster spaces, newspaper advertising and so on. On the 
"Yes" side (that is, campaigning for devolution, since the 
referendum question asked whether the Scotland Act should 
be put into effect) the main campaigning groups were to be 
the Labour Movement Yes Campaign, the Scottish National 
Party, the Yes for Scotland group, the Alliance for an 
Assembly, the Liberals and the Communists, although other 
groups emerged during the campaign, such as the Conservative 
Yes group and several student organisations. The "No" side 
was slightly less fragmented, with Scotland Says No, Labour 
Vote No and the Conservati:ve Party No campaign. 
This fragmentation, particularly among the "Yes" groups, 
crucially affected the campaign and the way the issues were 
presented. It resulted mainly from the fact that the different 
groups had different reasons for supporting the devolution 
legislation. The Labour Movement - the Labour Party, 
Co-operative Party and Scottish Trades Union Congress -
supported the establishment of an Assembly with limited powers 
over domestic affairs as a way of answering the demand from 
Scots for more say in their own affairs without going as far 
as setting up an independent state as demanded by the SNP. 
In three by-elections in 1978 Labour had used devolution as 
an effective counter to the Nationalists' demand for indepen-
dence. The Nationalists, on the other hand, supported the 
Assembly only as a step on the road to independence. This 
divergence of view led Labour to refuse to take any part 
in a joint campaign with the SNP: "We will not soil our 
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hands," said Mrs Helen Liddell, secretary of the Scottish 
Councitl of the Labour Party. 
This schism was the most damaging to the "Yes" cause. 
It led to wasteful duplication of effort, particularly at local 
level, where SNP branches and the committees set up by all 
but a handful of Labour constituency parties worked in parallel 
delivering leaflets, arranging meetings and canvassing. But it 
also meant there were occasional public arguments between the 
two groups and it gave the "No" campaign an effective argu-
ment against the Assembly: there was an obvious contradiction 
between Labour urging a "Yes" vote against separation and 
the SNP urging a "Yes" vote as a means to independence. 
There were lesser splits in other parts of the "Yes" 
campaign. Scotland Says Yes, supposedly an all-party group 
led by Lord Kilbrandon, who had chaired the Royal Com-
mission on the Constitution which had recommended an 
Assembly for Scotland, was boycotted by Labour because it 
contained Nationalists. Although it did have a Conservative 
as its organiser, its leading lights were the Nationalists Mrs 
Margo MacDonald and Mr George Reid MP and the leader 
of the breakaway Scottish Labour Party, which advocated 
independence for Scotland, Mr Jim Sillars MP. This close 
identification with nationalism was too much for Mr Alick 
Buchanan-Smith, the Conservative MP who had resigned from 
the Shadow Cabinet over his support for devolution. He formed 
his own cross-party group, the Alliance for an Assembly and 
was joined by the Liberal MP Mr Russell Johnston and the 
Labour MP Mr Donald Dewar. The Liberal and Communist 
Parties contributed at local level to the efforts of Scotland 
Says Yes, but also ran campaigns of their own. 
The effectiveness of the "Yes" argument was weakened 
still further by the split within the Labour Movement itself. 
There had always been a difference of opinion, even in Scotland, 
over the importance of the devolution policy to Labour, but 
the party leadership was unprepared for just how much this 
was to counter the success of the official "Yes" campaign. The 
split ran through the party from the six of thirty-nine Scottish 
Labour MPs who openly urged a "No" vote, to the unions, 
councillors and constituency parties. The Labour Vote No 
group, chaired by Mr Brian Wilson, one of the ablest of the 
younger Labour candidates, was effective chiefly in frustrating 
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the "Yes" campaign at local level by persuading activists not 
to take part, in seeking publicity and in taking a very bold 
initiative in the Court of Session to stop party political broad-
casts during the campaign which would have been three 
(Labour, Liberal and SNP) to one (Conservative) in favour of 
devolution. The official Labour leadership also underestimated 
Mr Tam Dalyell (West Lothian), the most persistent anti-
devolution MP. It regarded him as so fanatical as not to be 
taken seriously, but he addressed a phenomenal number of 
meetings with the same simple arguments (the nature of which 
I will discuss later) and by the end of the campaign there 
was evidence that they were going home. 
Labour Vote No did not formally co-operate with Scotland 
Says No, but there was not the same antipathy between the 
groups that existed between Labour and the SNP and in fact 
at least one member of the Labour No campaign, Mr Robin 
Cook, appeared on a Scotland Says No platform. The "Yes" 
groups also underestimated the effectiveness of Scotland Says 
No. This organisation had its origins in a loose group called 
Keep Britain United, formed in 1976 by lain Sproat (Conser-
vative MP for Aberdeen South) to campaign within the Con-
servative Party against its then official policy of setting up a 
legislative Assembly for Scotland. The following year it was 
broadened to include the Confederation of British Industry. 
some Chambers of Commerce and some individual Labour 
Party members like Mr Archie Birt, a party activist from 
Gourock, and Mr Danny Crawford, Scottish executive member 
of the building workers' union UCATT. The name was changed 
to Scotland is British and the group campaigned effectively 
against the two devolution Bills. It was relaunched as Scotland 
Says No at the end of November 1978 with many of the same 
people involved, but also some new faces, including its joint 
chairmen, the Very Rev Andrew Herron, a former Moderator 
of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and Lord 
Wilson of Langside, a former Labour Minister, and its full 
time campaign manager, a former Conservative agent, Mr Hew 
Carruthers. 
Scotland Says No was well organised. It raised money 
quickly (about £80,000, mostly from companies), produced eye-
catching leaflets and other propaganda, booked advertising 
space in virtually every local and national newspaper in Scot-
E 
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land and organised local campaign groups. Its contacts 
in management not only donated money, but also distributed 
leaflets. The Clydesdale Bank sent Scotland Says No material 
to its branch managers and some other firms put them in pay 
packets. Although they decided not to join forces, the two 
main "No" groups remained friendly and Scotland Says No 
attempted to avoid duplication of effort by leaving what might 
be called "subversi.ve" work among Labour activists to Labour 
Vote No. The larger group also kept a record of Labour No 
public meetings and gave information on them when asked. 
The position of the Conservative Party in the campaign 
was equivocal. Its official policy still favoured some form of 
devolution, although there were varying degrees of enthusiasm 
among the leadership, but the party was against the Scotland 
Act. Some prominent members, like Mr Teddy Taylor, then 
MP for Cathcart and shadow Scottish spokesman, wanted the 
party to campaign all-out on its own behalf against the Act, 
but at a private conference early in 1979 the decision was 
taken to take part only as a supporter of Scotland Says No 
and allow proponents of devolution, such as Mr Buchanan-
Smith and Mr Malcolm Rifkind, MP for Edinburgh Pentlands, 
to follow their consciences and campaign for the Act. In the 
event, although Mr Taylor and other individuals put a lot 
of effort into the campaign, the contribution of the party 
machine, the Central Office staff in Edinburgh and local agents 
and elected officers, was muted. Very little party money was 
spent on the campaign and many local parties did nothing 
more than distribute the Scotland Says No leaflet supplied 
to them free of charge by Central Office. 
These, then were the main actors in the campaign. The 
period between the Queen's Speech and Christmas was taken 
up with internal organisation, there was a lull for the Christmas 
and New Year holidays and then most of the groups began 
their campaigns. The exception was the Labour Movement, 
which decided to wait until the second week in February and 
conduct a short, sharp campaign of General Election length. 
It was decided that this would be more effective than a longer 
campaign, which would tend to make people bored with the 
whole question, but as a tactical ploy it failed. The start given 
to Scotland Says No enabled it to put its arguments first and 
stake out the ground for the campaign. When Labour began 
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to put its case it never effectively gained the initiative. Con-
sidering that Labour had the advantage of a virtual monopoly 
on well-known names, it was a major coup by Scotland Says No 
to be able to dictate the issues on which the campaign was 
to be fought. 
The Scottish National Party also started its campaign in 
January after a special one-day conference which adapted the 
existing policies for an independent Scotland to the limits of 
the Assembly. Thereafter a large part of the SNP campaign 
consisted of publicising these policies. The argument was that 
if people were going to vote for an Assembly, they had a 
right to know what the parties were proposing it should do. 
However, this was putting the cart before the horse and 
deflected effort from actually winning support for the devolved 
legislature. Yes for Scotland began its campaign in a slightly 
different fashion, describing at various Press conferences what 
the Assembly would be able to do, for women, for example, 
or for the social services or education. 
The issues in the campaign were by this time already fixed 
and from my observations of canvassing and the questions 
asked at public meetings they varied remarkably little through-
out the campaign. They were whether or not the Assembly 
would lead to the break-up of the UK, whether it would mean 
more bureaucracy and more government and whether it would 
cost more. To hear these expressed by genuinely undecided 
voters was to hear how effective the "No" campaign had been. 
They were almost invariably expressed in a negative way. When 
a canvasser on the doorstep - where most contact with the 
voters takes place - meets a person who tells him the Assembly 
will lead to the break-up of the UK, it is extremely difficult to 
argue that on the contrary it wiH help to prevent the break-up 
of the UK, particularly when the SNP are campaigning in 
favour of an Assembly as a step towards independence. 
Similarly the canvasser confronted with the basic statement 
that the Assembly will cost more and mean more bureaucracy 
finds it difficult to put over the much subtler argument that 
by actually controlling the bureaucracy the Assembly will be 
able to reduce cost. 
The "democratic" argument, that the Assembly was 
essential to make the Civil Servants in the Scottish Office more 
accountable and more responsive to public opinion, was to 
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many "Yes" campaigners the strongest justification for devo-
lution. But it was never established as an issue in its own 
right, merely as a counter to the "extra cost, extra bureau-
cracy" argument of the "No" side. Another drawback for the 
"Yes" canvassers was that the Assembly, as proposed under 
the Scotland Act, had no economic powers, whereas (as 
op~nion polls during the subsequent General Election cam-
paign showed) the main preoccupations of Scottish voters were 
prices and jobs. "Yes" canvassers that I watched found it 
difficult to give electors reasons for turning out to vote for 
a Parliament which would not be able to deal with their 
pressing concerns. 
For the "Yes" campaign to be effective, 1t needed to 
confront these issues head-on, but it did not. Instead it persisted 
in putting what to many voters seemed like irrelevant points. 
These were not only the finer details of what an Assembly 
might do, but the complete red herrings of the 40% rule and 
the "No" campaign's funds. "Yes" speakers (and it was 
d~fficult in the last days of the campaign to listen to Mr Jim 
Sillars or any one of a number of SNP speakers who did not 
dwell on both at length) seemed to believe that railing against 
the unfairness of the Cunningham Amendment, or repeating 
the unsubstantiated allegation that Scotland Says No was 
financed by "English Gold" or big business (or both) would 
produce a wave of popular indignation that would sweep 
people to the polls to vote "Yes". It did not. Towards the end 
of the campaign the "No" side also got on to this side 
track, spending much of its time accusing the "Yes" campaign 
of deliberately spreading the false impression that an abstention 
was equivalent to a "No" vote. 
The "Yes" side was not w1thout its successes, for example 
in getting genuine support from shop stewards through the 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. Most 
unions, except UCATT, paid lip service to the "Yes" cause. Some, 
like the Transport and General Workers, went much further, 
producing a full-colour broadsheet and encouraging its officials 
at all levels to take part in the campaign. But practical help was 
in short supply. The "Yes" majority in Strathclyde seem to owe 
something to the work of stewards in their workshops. How-
ever, the "No" side produced two coups late in the campaign. 
Dr Herron managed to persuade the Church of Scotland not to 
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issue a pastoral message in favour of devolution. Although 
many mini,sters had already read the message from their pulpits, 
the effect of Dr Herron's action was to confuse the position of 
the Church, which had been a long standing supporter of 
devolution. The second was persuading Lord Home, a former 
Conservative Prime Minister and a man with great influence 
among Conservatives in Scotland, to speak out against the 
Assembly. Coming from the man who had produced the 
Conservative devolution proposals, his speech was surprising. 
He said that the Scotland Act had five fundamental defects 
including its lack of tax-raising powers and system of election, 
and ought to be rejected. This was precisely the opposite view 
to that taken by Mr Buchanan-Smith and Mr Rifkind, who 
attempted to undo the damage by launching a separate Con-
servative "Yes" campaign in the last week. They argued that 
the Act had many shortcomings, but ought to be supported and 
once implemented could be amended. System Three polls in 
the Glasgow Herald showed that although in the last week of 
January 39% of Conservati,ve supporters were intending to vote 
"Yes", against 45% "No" and 16% undecided, by the last 
week in February the proportion intending to vote "No" had 
risen to 71%, with 19% "Yes" and 10% undecided. 
The Conservatives had a motive for campaigning against 
the Act which was nothing to do with the government of 
Scotland. They knew that a defeat for the legislation, which 
had occupied most of two sessions of Parliament and was 
central to the Government's policy, would severely damage Mr 
Callaghan's Administration, although they cannot have fore-
seen how effectively the strategy would work. Some leading 
members of the then Shadow Cabinet, including Mrs Margaret 
Thatcher, the leader, and Mr Francis Pym, who had been 
devolution spokesmen, wanted to come to Scotland to cam-
paign for a "No" vote. They were dissuaded by Mr Taylor 
who believed that the appearance of too many English 
politicians would be counter-productive. Similarly Labour knew 
that it was fighting for more than a principle. The SNP was 
split on its enthusiasm for the measure. The "moderate, 
gradualist" wing such as Mr George Reid and Mrs Margo 
MacDonald, saw the Assembly as an essential step towards 
independence. A minority in the party, notably Professor Neil 
MacCormick, believed it to be possibly an end in itself. But 
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other influential figures in the party including Mr Gordon 
Wilson, then deputy parliamentary leader, and Mr Douglas 
Henderson, then MP for East Aberdeenshire, believed devolution 
to be a distraction to the main task in hand and therefore 
campaigned half-heartedly for the Scotland Act. 
The difficulty both sides encountered in getting enough 
active workers to undertake persuasive canvassing meant that 
the campaign was largely fought out in the press and on 
television. Of the Scottish nationals, The Scotsman and the 
Daily Record were strongly in favour of a "Yes" vote and the 
Glasgow Herald and Sunday Mail moderately in favour. On 
the other side the Scottish Daily Express, which had once been 
rabidly pro-devolution, was equally fervently anti by the time 
it came to the referendum. So was its sister Sunday newspaper 
and the Sunday Post. Of the London papers, The Observer, 
the Guard•ian and The Financial Times were moderately pro 
and the Daily Mail and The Daily and The Sunday Telegraph 
were anti. (The Times and The Sunday Times were not pub-
lished). Most of the papers (and all the broadcasting organis-
ations) attempted to be fair to both sides in their news coverage. 
The exceptions were the Record, which gave much more space 
to the "Yes" arguments than "No" ones, and the Express, which 
mainly treated "Yes" arguments with derision and went so 
far on one occasion as to suppress the main findings of an opinion 
poll it had itself commissioned (leading its story instead with 
a report of ludicrously unrepresentative straw polls among 
students and school children). 
In the last days of the campaign the opinion polls predicted 
the result with reasonable accuracy. After so many years of 
discussing devolution it is perhaps understandable that many 
ordinary voters were tired of it. The result is difficult to interpret 
and is likely to be the cause of controversy for years to come: 
approximately one-third of the electorate voted "Yes", one 
third "No" and the remaining third was not sufficiently 
motivated by either side to vote at all. · 
I shall end with a short footnote on Orkney and Shetland. 
We cannot go into the reason in detail, but i.t should be pointed 
out that the referendum campaign in the northern isles was 
largely fought on different issues than in the rest of the country. 
Shetlanders, particularly, wanted a Constitutional Commission 
to examine their status within the UK and had been promised 
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one in the event of an Assembly being set up for the rest of 
Scotland. However, the parliamentary manoeuvering that went 
on during the committee stage of the Scotland Bill confused 
many Shetlanders and they were unsure whether they should 
vote "Yes" or "No" in order to get the Commission. And 
so on. March 1 only 27% of those who voted, voted "Yes" in 
Shetland and only 28% in Orkney. These proportions were 
far below those in the rest of the country - thei[' nearest 
rivals being the Borders Region, and Dumfries and Galloway 
in both of which only 40% of the electorate favoured the 
Act. Yet who would have supposed, even a year before, that 
devolution far from commanding the support of 40% of the 
electorate would be endorsed by only 40% of those voting in 
some parts of the country? It is this reversal which I have tried 
to explain in this chapter. 
